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Russia militarily invaded Chechnya in December 1994 expecting to easily
suppress the separatist uprising in the region. The Russian Army was unprepared and
had greatly underestimated the Chechen forces under the command of former Soviet Air
Force General Jokhar Dudayev and his motivated field commanders with recent war
experience in Afghanistan, Abkazia, and Azerbaijan. When Russian forces began to gain
a decided advantage (due to overwhelming firepower and numeric superiority) between
February and June of 1995 and began attacking the last Chechen strongholds deep in the
southern mountains, Chechen tactics changed. The June hostage raid, led by Chechen
Commander Shamil Basayev, against Russian civilians in the town of Budennovsk
marked the beginning of a successful campaign of terrorism by Chechen combatants that
had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war. The Budennovsk episode, which
resulted in a short-lived cease-fire, was followed by a series of more varied terrorist
attacks between June 1995 and January 1996. These attacks were successful in swaying
public opinion against the war effort, in creating widespread fear among the Russian
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The Chechen people see themselves as a strong, lone wolf - proud, independent,
resilient, and fierce. This image is so symbolic to Chechens that it appears on their green
national flag and in the Chechen Republic Homepage on the Internet. As described by
Suzanne Goldenberg, author of The Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-
Soviet Disorder, the symbolism is profound; the wolf, Chechnya's "emblem of freedom."
The emblem of freedom shows a seated wolf on a mountain top in the light of a
full moon. The green represents Islam, and the wolf the uncompromising
independence of the mountain people. 1
On the Chechen Homepage under the heading of "Chechen People," you can access a
photograph of a black wolf and large bison. The accompanying caption reads, "the wolf
is a Chechen and the bison is a Russian. The small wolf is facing a big, strong bison and
the wolf is ready to fight."2
The image of a Chechen wolf facing down a Russian bison, and the Chechen War
itself, present inescapable parallels to the biblical fable of David and Goliath. In the
fable, a small, young, ill-equipped David defeats the giant Goliath with a mighty blow
from a slingshot. In the Chechen War, a numerically inferior, less well equipped
Chechen National Guard managed to defeat the huge Russian state and its powerful army
with a series of mighty blows from another unorthodox weapon. The Chechen weapon
that brought down the Russian giant is terrorism.
1
Suzanne Goldenberg, The Pride ofSmall Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Zed
Books, 1994), 183.
2
"Chechen People," Chechen Republic Homepage, http://www.amina.com/chechens; Internet.
1
The Russian war effort was plagued with problems when military and federal
J
troops first entered Chechnya, in December 1994, with the objectives of suppressing the
three-year old nationalist movement in the region, reinstating a 'legitimate' government,
and restoring order. Russia suffered from problems of poor preparedness, inexperienced
and inadequately trained forces, inept leadership, failed logistics, lack of coordination
between military and federal units, inadequate security, and underestimation of the
enemy's capabilities. It took Russian forces two months to gain control of most of
Grozny, the capital city; a job they had predicted would take a week. Despite this slow
start, however, Russia quickly began to push Chechen forces deeper into the southern
mountains through a methodical conquest of towns and villages along the way. By early
June 1995, with Russian units launching attacks on the last Chechen strongholds, Russia
seemed certain to win.
The Chechens had fought valiantly with great tenacity and courage, but Russia's
much larger, more powerful forces had overcome them. Chechnya was losing its fight
for independence from Russia just as it had more than a century before. Then one
desperate and now infamous Chechen commander, Shamil Basayev, launched a series of
terrorist attacks against Russian civilians beyond the war zone that very effectively
changed the course and the ultimate outcome of the Chechen War.
Russia lost the Chechen War, but why? A number of accounts have analyzed
Russia's military failings and tactical inadequacies during the war in an effort to answer
that question. Those analyses have explored in detail the problems mentioned above and
3
Tactical analyses reviewed in the course of researching this thesis include: Raymond Finch, "Why the
Russian Military Failed in Chechnya" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, undated);
2
a gamut of other contributing factors. Generally, Russia is given much more credit for
losing the war, than Chechnya is given for winning it. The position taken in this thesis is
that Russia would have won the war despite all of its problems. Russia's loss was due
not so much to the failings of the Russian Army, but more to Chechnya's strategic use of
terrorism. The basic premise of this thesis is that the campaign of terror, executed by
Chechen combatants over a seven month period from mid-June 1995 to late January
1996, determined Chechnya's success and Russia's loss.
No substantive body of work to date has evaluated the strategic contribution that
terrorism played in Chechnya's winning of the war. That is what this thesis sets out to
do. The research materials gathered for use in this thesis consist primarily of numerous
professional articles, the findings of military and humanitarian research organizations,
and vast media accounts and interpretations of events during the war.
Why did Chechnya resort to terror as a tactic of war? How significant was the use
of terrorism to the Chechnya's victory? What are the implications for Chechnya and for
future warfare?
In this introductory chapter, terrorism will be delineated from legitimate acts of
war through examination of globally accepted laws governing warfare and human rights
Chapter II provides a historical overview of Chechnya and outlines events in the three
Charles Blandy, David Isby, David Markov and Steven Zaloga, "The Chechen Conflict: A Microcosm of
the Russian Army's Past, Present, and Future," Jane 's Intelligence Review, Special Report Number 11,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1996; Vitaly Shlykov, "The War in Chechnya: Implications
for Military Reform and Creation of Mobile Forces," in War in Chechnya: Implicationsfor Russian
Security Policy, ed. Mikhail Tsypkin (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, July 1996), 57-71;
Stephen Blank and Earl Tilford Jr., "Russia's Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment," Strategic
Studies Institute Special Report, Carlisle Barracks PA: US Army War College, 1995; and Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), 240-246.
years leading up to full-scale war with Russia. Chechnya's campaign of terrorism during
the war is detailed in Chapter III and, in conclusion, Chapter IV will provide responses to
the questions above. A chronology of the key events covered in this thesis is provided in
the appendix for use as a quick reference.
A. DEFINING TERRORISM
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism.4 More than one
hundred definitions were in use in 1981 and no generic consensus has since emerged, nor
is one likely to be forthcoming. 5 In Terrorism in Context, Martha Crenshaw succinctly
explains the problem of defining terrorism:
Terrorism is an ambiguous variable not easily measured or quantified, in part
because there are multiple forms of terrorism, and they are easily confused with
other styles of violence. 6
Crenshaw goes further toward explaining the lack of consensus on a definition in a paper
she authored for the Institute of East-West Security Studies.
... the effort to define terrorism has led to widespread confusion and
misunderstanding. Definitions are often subjective and self-serving, or thought to
be so by those who oppose the political interpretation they support. The
international community is still working to develop a common and acceptable
vocabulary for discussing the issue. Some ambiguities are unavoidable because
4
Primary sources used in the Terrorism and Law section include: David Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism
(New York: The Free Press, 1990); Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (University Park PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); idem, Terrorism and International Cooperation: Occasional
Paper Series 11 (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989); James Bond, The Rules of
Riot: Internal Conflict and the Law of War (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Brigitte
Nacos, "After the Cold War: Terrorism Looms Larger as a Weapon of Dissent and Warfare," Current
World Leaders, Volume 39, No. 4 (August 1996), 1 1-26. See also Louis Beres, "Terrorism, Law and




Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, 6.
they stem from the fact that terrorism is a complex and diverse activity, assuming
a variety of forms, including hostage-taking, mass-casualty bombings,
assassination and hijackings, and claiming a variety of motives, some
comprehensible and some manifestly unrealistic. To pretend that terrorism is a
unitary phenomenon is a misleading oversimplification, although terrorist activity
has patterns and structures. 7
Though the business of defining terrorism is confusing, there exists commonality,
what Crenshaw describes as patterns, underlying the varied definitions of terrorism. The
goals of terrorism are political intimidation and widespread fear; the objective is political
change or concession. Terrorist acts are well planned, always violent, and occur without
warning. The victims of terrorism are unsuspecting innocents (non-combatants), but
society at large and the political structures opposed by the terrorists' cause are the
intended targets. For this reason, publicity is critical to the success of any terrorist action.
On the topic of publicity, Chechen authorities always ensured that their messages
and their version of events were presented as widely as possible. Correspondents were
given very liberal access into Chechen areas throughout the war. Shamil Basayev more
than anyone else recognized the importance of extensive media coverage. He demanded
coverage during terrorist activities and otherwise courted the media openly. He issued
personally signed safe passage documents for some correspondents, gave interviews from
his command posts or living quarters very frequently, and on occasion had
correspondents as guests in his home. Anatol Lieven, a correspondent for the London
Times, was a recipient of "Basayev's hospitality" on a number of occasions and was once
Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 2-3.
5
a guest in the home of Basayev's aunt. Carlotta Gall spoke of gaining access to places in
Chechnya as a reporter for The Independent, another London publication.
They [Chechen fighters] were polite, especially to a journalist from Britain which
retains a good reputation in Chechnya from pre-revolutionary times. Any
suspicion they showed was instantly dispelled by a pass bearing Mr. Basayev's
personal red stamp with its emblem of the lone wolf. 9
Returning to the complexities of defining terrorism, the task becomes even more
complicated when trying to "distinguish terrorism in particular from political violence in
general."
10
Terrorism is often confused with forms of low intensity conflict such as
guerilla warfare, insurgencies, and nationalist movements since these activities "involve
low-level violence ... by weaker parties in conflict," that often resort to terrorism as a
tactic.
11
Hence, the coining of phrases like "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter" and "terrorism is the weapon of the weak." This phenomenon of terror does not
occur in all low intensity conflicts, however, and when it does it is but one tactic used in
combination with 'legitimate' warfare, as prescribed by international and customary
law.
12
In the case of Chechnya, the threat of terrorism was ever present, but terror was
not employed until the situation became desperate in June 1995. Seven months later,
when Chechnya had regained the upper hand, Chechen combatants stopped committing
Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone ofRussian Power (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1998), 21,22.
'
"Basayev Interviewed on Chechen Conflict," The Independent (London), 17 August 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-
161, 11 paragraphs, paragraph 7.
Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, 12.
Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 6.
12
Long, 123.
acts of terror against noncombatants and reverted back to 'legitimate' warfare against
military targets.
The overriding political characteristic of terrorism is what sets it "apart from
violent criminal acts or those of the emotionally disturbed."
13 The egregious violence
and stark criminality are what set it apart from other forms of political violence. 14
Legitimate warfare adheres to customarily accepted norms of human behavior and
humanitarian law; terrorism does not.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ITS
APPLICATIONS IN THE CASE OF CHECHNYA
Mankind is often inhumane and very prone to war. "In the 3,500 years since man
began writing his history, he has recorded only 270 years of peace." 15 Terrorism is
rooted in the worst of man's inhumanity and before the custom of laws came into place to
curb atrocity, man was unconscionably brutal, killing everyone and destroying everything
in his way with little provocation.
The Jews were the first to display inklings of humanity for one's enemies, but the
establishment and practice of formalized rules of war first appeared among the Romans
and the Greeks. These rules accorded protection for noncombatants, certain other
officials and manmade structures, and respectful treatment of the dead; they outlawed the







exchanging prisoners and conducting other administrative functions. These rules were
not legally binding, but were customarily practiced among the Greeks and Romans and
from them these practices spread to other cultures of the time. Of course, the motivations
behind establishing rules of war were born out of self-interest as much as any
humanitarian impulse. Political influences, too, contributed. Just as today, it was
advantageous to limit the destruction of what might someday be your property through
conquest.
16
The "law of arms" and the concept of "just war" further developed in the
medieval era under the guidance of the Catholic Church and, with the rise of sovereign
states, war became accepted as an instrument of foreign policy. During the Middle Ages,
the laws governing the conduct of war expanded to regulate discipline within armies, the
handling of administrative matters, and the conduct of combatants toward their enemies
(to include the obligation of knights to "grant quarter" to opponents wishing to
surrender). These laws, for the first time, were applicable to both international and
internal conflicts. As in ancient times, these rules became customarily observed by those
not bound to them by law. 17
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War, is
considered the origin of modern international law. The law of war was the first
undertaking of the treaty members and the resulting "Rights of War and Peace," by





protection of noncombatants, the limiting of destruction, and the treatment of surrendered
soldiers. As in ancient and medieval times, the new laws became customary practice, and
even militaries not bound to them largely adhered to them. By the mid- 19th Century, the
principles ascribed in Grotius' work began to appear in military manuals and state
treaties.
18 Of particular significance, the laws of war were applied in some internal
conflicts. In The Rules ofRiot, James Edward Bond provided this excerpt from the
regulations governing the Union Army during the American Civil War:
Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the
armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and
every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the
captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and
channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance
or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's
country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such
deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged,
regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by modern law of
war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not
cease on the account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of suffering
for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in
fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in
any way, nor the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but
disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general,. military necessity does not include any
act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult. 19
Bond concludes from this passage: "That a civil war rather than an international conflict
should produce such a regulation evidences ... the general desirability of applying the







It was the American Civil War that prompted an international movement to codify
the laws of war." 1 A series of International Conventions and Declarations set about the
task. These included the Geneva Conventions of 1863 and 1906, the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907, and the 1874 Brussels Declaration. Each, in succession, revised and
considered for adoption the guidelines prescribed in the previous ones. World War I,
once again, emphasized the significance of customary law in the absence of legal
necessity and the power of universally accepted norms for human behavior. The Geneva
and Hague Conventions were not legally binding in World War I because not all of the
participants were signatories. Yet, the "participants generally complied with their
provisions and even concluded more detailed agreements covering treatment of civilians
and prisoners of war."" " By World War II, most of the participants had ratified the Hague
and Geneva (as revised in 1929) Conventions.
In 1949, Geneva hosted four Conventions on the treatment of the wounded and
sick in land battle, the treatment of wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea, the treatment
of prisoners of war, and the protection of noncombatants, respectively. These
conventions still "enjoy almost universal adherence" today. 23
As discussed, adherence to international law has occurred throughout history
without the impetus of legal obligation; hence, customary law seems to prevail. This
point has been highlighted throughout this section to provoke understanding for the








governed the conduct of war since the Middle Ages above all else protect the rights of
noncombatants, the preferred targets of terrorists. Louis Beres provides this appraisal of
the importance of customary law, or as he terms it "natural law:""
For more than 2000 years, the idea of natural law has served as the ultimate
standard of right and wrong, of lawfulness and lawlessness.
It must also be understood that all law is rooted in natural law, and that natural
law could never countenance violence against the innocent; that is, natural law
would not consider such violence to be outside the boundaries of terrorism."
Until 1949, however, states were, from a legal standpoint, free to handle internal
conflicts as they saw fit, and rebel forces had no recourse or protections once they
displayed themselves in armed opposition to the state. Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions was the first, and remains the only, internationally binding set of rules that
can be mandated in internal conflicts. Article 3 is "common to all four Geneva
Conventions of 1949," and is "often called the 'miniature convention' because it
embodies the fundamental principles of the law of war."26 Though limited in scope,
Article 3 applies "in the case of armed conflict not of an international character" and
provides for the basic human rights of "persons taking no active part in the hostilities."
It requires, at a minimum, the humane and fair treatment of noncombatants and the sick
and wounded by prohibiting physical harm, hostage-taking, humiliating or degrading
treatment, and summary execution. Article 3 also makes the offer of humanitarian
Customary law, modern law, and natural law are interchangeable terms used to express the customs and




Bond, 16, n 43.
Ibid., 34-35, n 106. Excerpted from the preamble and paragraph 1 of Article 3.
11
service possible. (Article 3 does not mention limiting destruction or the use of specific
types of weapons.) Once rebels achieve 'belligerent' status, they become "a de facto
state" and as such are entitled to the benefits and are restricted to the limits of the law. 28
To be considered belligerent the state's opposition must have a "responsible
government," possess territory, have an army that functions under the law of war, be
recognized as a belligerent by a third state, and be engaged in hostilities.29 Chechnya met
these requirements until it turned to illegal tactics and began targeting Russian
noncombatants.
Of course, the very atrocities that the laws governing war seek to curtail continue
to happen from time to time, but the development of humanitarian law, the basis for the
laws of war, represents the sincere desire of mankind to limit the suffering. Additionally,
history has shown the genuine willingness of man to adhere to rules that will limit his
own violent potential.
This makes the events in Chechnya even less justifiable. Chechnya has displayed
not only its knowledge of but also its respect for customary and international laws. In
1992, a self-proclaimed independent Chechnya adopted a new Constitution. Article 3 of
the Chechen Constitution reads:
The human being constitutes the highest value and main aim of state policy. The
Chechen Republic respects and protects human rights, secures equal opportunities
for the free development of the individual, and guarantees social justice and the






in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international
law.
30
Shamil Basayev often spoke of international law when deploring Russian aerial
bombardments. When outlining, in a May 1996 interview, the goals for cessation of
hostilities as he saw them, he called for the end of bombardments and Russian troop
withdrawal followed by "democratic elections based on international legal standards."31
The following statements, from an article written by Brigette Nacos for Current
World Leaders, summarize a number of key points made thus far; especially, Chechnya's
methodical use of terrorism, the role played by the media, and Dudayev's awareness of
the international implications.
In the Chechen rebels' struggle for independence terrorism figured
prominently from the onset. Well aware of their own military weakness and
Moscow's overwhelming military power, rebel leaders warned as early as 1992
that they would detonate bombs in the Moscow subway system and attack
vulnerable nuclear plants . . . Eventually, they resorted repeatedly to the classic
terrorist act - taking and holding large numbers of Russians hostage. By early
1996 [Jokhar] Dudayev, the leader of the Chechen separatists, threatened terrorist
attacks against Western Europe, not Moscow, charging that the West supported
Russia's aggression against Chechnya. Dudayev used the threat of transnational
terrorism in an obvious effort to move the Russian-Chechen civil strife from the
domestic into the international realm. 32
When Chechen separatists took Russian civilians hostage during their
protracted struggle against the Russian military, it was by definition an act of
domestic terrorism. If this had happened in the Soviet Union of old, the Kremlin
could and probably would have ended the hostage situation with military might
regardless of the hostages' fate. But with a free press broadcasting TV pictures of
desperate hostages and their families all over Russia and the world, President
30
Paul Henze, Islam In The North Caucasus: The Example of Chechnya (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1995),
35.
31
"Chechen Leader Basayev Interviewed," Vecherniy Novosibirsk (Russia), 1 March 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-




Boris Yeltsin had to consider and actually deal with domestic and international
reactions to his crisis management and especially to the use of force. 33
Before concluding discussion on the development of humanitarian law, it should
also be acknowledged that not all laws governing warfare are absolute. Humanitarianism
and military necessity are contradictory. Trying to accommodate both when establishing
the rules of warfare leads to some ambiguity. Military necessity can at times outweigh
humanitarian concerns. Some rules are absolute, such as the prohibitions on hostage
taking. Others are not. The 'non-absolute' rules, such as those governing aerial
bombardment, are ambiguous and the source of much debate.
The examples, hostage taking and aerial bombardment, selected to illustrate the
absoluteness and ambiguities of humanitarian law are not accidental choices. They are
very central issues in the case of Chechnya and must be considered when discerning the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the tactics employed by both the Chechens and the Russians.
Hostage taking is an act of terrorism. It is unequivocally illegal under humanitarian law
and outside the boundaries of customary behavior. The rules governing aerial
bombardment warrant evaluation since Chechen President Jokhar Dudayev and field
commander Shamil Basayev have repeatedly offered Russian aerial bombardments as
justification for their acts of terror.
C. THE ISSUE OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND CHECHNYA AS A
CASE IN POINT




terrorists. They feel that their actions are justified by their 'underdog' status or in
retribution for wanton death and destruction they have suffered at the hands of their
enemy. They turn to terrorism only as a last resort to overcome insurmountable odds;
terror is their last hope for victory, or so the story goes. And as Crenshaw points out,
"oppositions who use terrorism also attempt to provide frames of reference and
comparisons that place them in a morally advantageous light."34 That was certainly the
case in Chechnya. Shamil Basayev, the Chechen commander who led the Budennovsk
hostage raid, has repeatedly justified Chechen tactics by drawing reference to Russian
bombardments of Chechen towns and villages. Here are two examples of this, and his
frequent references to international law, from interviews in 1996:
They say that Budennovsk was terror. And the fact that the Russian Air Force is
bombing our villages every day - that is not terror? . . . [Budennovsk] was a
response reaction. We were compelled to resort to extreme means in order simply
to survive.
35
I am not a bandit . . . Russia is breaking all the international laws and the United
Nations does nothing. 36
Russia did conduct brutal aerial and artillery bombardments on the Chechen
capital of Grozny during the first three months of the war, from December 1994 through
February 1996. Not only Chechens, but humanitarian organizations, to include Russia's
own human rights commission and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), considered the intensity of bombardments excessive in those early
Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, 1 1
.
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"Basayev on Russian Inefficiency in Chechnya," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 15 May 1996, FBIS-
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months. Russia reduced the intensity and frequency of bombardments after the initial
battle to take Grozny and did not resume that initial intensity even after the momentum of
battle shifted in Chechnya's favor a few months later. In this regard, Chechnya serves
as a case in point for Bond's assertion that:
First, states that quell riots, insurrections, or even revolts quickly do not feel
bound to respect Article 3. In the absence of any widely held expectation that
they should conform to Article 3, they act under emergency or martial law. The
internal conflict is over before the international community can apprize itself of
the facts and generate any pressure on the competing parties to comply with the
provisions of Article 3 or humanitarian law in general. States do, second and
nevertheless, accept some obligation to treat opposing forces humanely if the
conflict drags on beyond several weeks or months. 38
As pointed out by Nacos, it is very unlikely that the old Soviet Union would have
felt any pressure to reduce bombardments. In those days, of course, the events would
have remained obscured to glances from the outside world or from inside the Soviet
Union itself. Here again the importance of a large media presence in Chechnya can not
be overemphasized, not when considering the success of Chechen terror tactics or when
considering Russia's reduction of bombardments. Russia had to consider seriously the
international reprisals that it received.
Aerial bombardments are seen by many, not just the Chechens, as
unconscionable, and there have been strong efforts to ban bombings since the balloon and
the canon were invented. Article 25 from the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited such
attacks on undefended cities; however, there is another rule that permits the "incidental
7
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injury" of noncombatants during attacks on "legitimate military targets."" In this
ambiguous situation, those against aerial bombings, the Red Cross being the most
vigilant, try to fall back on the broad protections in Article 3 in hopes of persuading a
ban. To date all attempts have failed. States have successfully argued that military
necessity prevails on the issue of bombardments. However questionable Russia's target
selection or aim may have been over Grozny, the bombing campaign was not illegal.
Aerial bombardment is an accepted form of warfare. Hostage taking, on the other hand,
is not. One does not justify the other in law or in custom.
Returning to a broader focus, the nature of war has changed dramatically since the
end of the cold war. In the regional, low intensity wars of today, the threat of terrorism is
inescapable. Recent events in Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere introduced terrorism as a
growing and disturbing trend in modem warfare. In Chechnya, the growing trend
reached maturity. The Chechen War provides the most vivid example of the strategic use
of terrorism as a tactic of war. Chechnya employed terrorism more extensively and more
successfully than previously witnessed in modern warfare.
Of course, not all nationalists, revolutionaries, and guerilla fighters are
terrorists.
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So, why did Chechnya resort to a campaign of terrorism? To fully evaluate
terrorism as it occurred during the Chechen War and to aid in drawing implications, a








Chechnya, located in the North Caucasus region, is one of Russia's southern
republics.
41
It is situated between the Russian republic of Dagestan to the north and east,
the republics of Ingushestia and North Ossetia to the west, and Georgia, formerly a Soviet
Republic, borders Chechnya to the south.42
Chechnya is 5,800 square miles in size, just slightly larger than the state of
Connecticut. The terrain to the north consists of fertile plains and two major rivers, the
Terek and Sunja. In the south, elevation rises from wooded foothills to the mountains of
the Caucasus range. This has been Chechen homeland for thousands of years.
The population of Chechnya before the outbreak of war with Russia in 1994 was
estimated at just over one million. According to the last available census data, collected
in 1989, approximately two-thirds of the inhabitants of Chechnya then were ethnic
Chechens, seventy percent of whom still lived in rural areas where they farmed and
raised livestock. Most of the Russians living in Chechnya migrated there, throughout the
20th Century, for employment opportunities in the developing petroleum industry.43 In
41
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1989, Russians made up the largest ethnic minority with 269,000 people, and
outnumbered Chechens in and around the capital city of Grozny by nearly two to one.44
The Chechens have a unique language that is most closely related to that of the
Ingush, but very distinctive from the more widespread Slavic and Turkic tongues.
Most Chechens are Sunni Muslims who practice the Sufi form of Islam that
places a mystical emphasis on personal unity with God and holy war. The conversion to
Islam occurred between the 17th and 19th Centuries, and is meshed into the Chechen
culture with many older, stronger traditions that are based in clan structures and their
rural, mountaineering heritage.
Prior to 1994, Grozny, the capital city, was a major center for oil production,
refinement and transit via pipelines of oil and gas, and served as a hub for commercial
and private transportation by vehicle and rail. All these infrastructures were decimated
by the war and little restoration has taken place due to Chechnya's economic difficulties
and current 'limbo' status politically.
Based on the peace agreement signed between Chechnya and Russia in late 1996,
a decision on Chechnya's sovereignty has been delayed for five years. Russia recognizes
the current Chechen government as provisional only and continues to employ economic
sanctions against Chechnya.
44
For Census data, see Kline, paragraph 4.
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A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Chechen people are staunchly independent with a rich warfighting heritage.
They fought valiantly for their independence against the Mongols in the 13 th Century, the
Turks in the 1
6
th Century and against Russian imperial rule for nearly a hundred years




The fiercest fighting against Russia occurred in the Caucasus War from 1817 to
1864. Imam Shamil, Chechen national hero and Shamil Basayev's namesake, led the
resistance for more than 30 of those years until his surrender to Russian forces in 1859.
Chechen resistance continued sporadically into the early 20th Century. Of this time,
Edward Kline, President of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation, wrote "the Russians won by
sheer force of numbers, and by carrying out a policy of relentless, destructive total war
from fortress towns such as Grozny."45
In November 1922, Chechnya became an Autonomous Oblast of the Russian
Federation and later, in 1934, upon merger with the neighboring Ingush Oblast, became
the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This new level of
sovereignty, however, was quite nebulous and short-lived. Neither the Chechens nor the
Ingush were spared from Stalin's madness during the purges of the 1930s and, in 1944,
under Soviet suspicions that they had aided the German invaders, all Chechens and
Ingush were systematically deported to Central Asia.




ended up in the Soviet Gulag. It is estimated that one third of the Chechen population
died during the period of resettlement from 1944 to 1957.
A vivid description of the Chechens appears in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Gulag
Archipelago.
There was one nation that would not give in, would not acquire the mental habits
of submission - and not just individual rebels among them, but the whole nation to
a man. These were the Chechens. They were capable of rustling cattle, robbing a
house, or sometimes simply taking what they wanted by force. They respected
only rebels . . . everyone was afraid of them. No one could stop them from living
as they did.
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In 1957, under decree by Khrushchev, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic was reconstituted and the Chechens were allowed to return to their
homeland. Most Chechens returned home and once there enjoyed relative peace from
1957 to 1991.
J
B. 1991-1994: CHECHNYA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
CIVIL WAR
As in many Soviet republics, Glasnost and Perestroika fostered ideas of
independence among many Chechens. In 1988, the Chechen-Ingush Popular Front
emerged in political opposition to the Communist Party. This movement had originally
formed as an environmental watch group in opposition to a proposed biochemical plant in
Gudermes, but within months had adopted a nationalistic political platform. In June
1989, f5oku Zavgaev, a Chechen, was elected as Secretary of the Communist Party. He




By late 1990, the Chechen National Congress was convened and Jokhar Dudayev
was elected as Chairman to its Executive Committee. The Chechen National Congress
quickly called for (Chechen-Ingush independence which was echoed within days by the
Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet in the form of a Declaration of Sovereignty.
By the summer of 1991, the Chechens' less fervent partners, the Ingush, had come
to the decision that they could best resolve any disputes with Moscow by remaining part
of mother Russia. The major contention the Ingush held with Russia was over ancestral
lands lost in 1944, and they were confident that they could regain their territory by
accepting membership in the new Russian Federation. Chechnya and Ingushetia
amicably separated in September 1991. In June 1992, the Russian Federation formally
recognized that separation and adopted into law the creation of the Ingush Republic.47
1. Jokhar Musaevich Dudayev
Jokhar Dudayev was only weeks old in 1944 when his family was forcibly
resettled in Kazakhstan. He was fourteen when they returned to Chechnya. 48 He
became a member of the Communist Party in 1966, as a young man, and went on to a
very successful career as an officer in the Soviet Air Force where he achieved the rank of
Major General. He resigned his position as Commander of a Strategic Bomber Group in
Estonia and retired from the Soviet military after his appointment to chair the Executive
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Zavgaev, who would lead Chechnya's challenge for independence from the failing Soviet
Union.
While Zavgaev was in Moscow in August 1991, at the time of the failed coup,
Dudayev set into motion a series of events to strip his presidential powers and ignite civil
war in Chechnya. Dudayev denounced the attempted coup and used the events to incite a
nationalist fervor that was manifested in large, riotous demonstrations supporting the
Chechen National Congress and Dudayev. Zavgaev returned from Moscow a few days
later, but was unable to regain control. In less than two weeks, Dudayev had formed the
National Guard and the Chechen National Congress had transferred power to the
Executive Committee. On 6 September, members of the National Guard entered a
meeting of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet and forced Zavgaev to abdicate control
of the Chechen government.49
2. Chechnya's Civil War and Russia's Reactions
Following Dudayev's ouster of Zavgaev, the Chechen National Congress called
for presidential elections to be held in October 1991. Prior to the elections, Moscow
twice sent representatives to Chechnya to meet with authorities in an attempt to restore
order and encourage renewed support for Zavgaev. Having failed in these efforts,
Moscow dispatched Ruslan Khasbulatov, one of Grozny's representatives to the Russian
Supreme Soviet, to Chechnya in September. His intervention resulted in the official
removal of Zavgaev, the disbanding of the Chechen parliament, and the creation of a




Dudayev's "radical" nationalists, the Moscow-friendly "conservatives," and other splinter
groups. Extreme dissention in the council prevented its ability to govern the Chechen
Republic, so the Chechen National Congress went ahead with plans for presidential and
parliamentary elections.
In early October, Moscow sent the Russian Vice-President, General Alexander
Rutskoi, to Grozny. Shortly afterward, with the urgings of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, the
Russian Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution in which they denounced the Chechen
National Congress and officially recognized the Provisional Council as the "only
legitimate state power."
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Thousands of Chechens demonstrated against the resolution in
the streets of Grozny, and Dudayev rapidly expanded the National Guard.
Despite Moscow's political machinations, Chechnya held elections as scheduled
on 27 October 1991 and Dudayev was elected President of Chechnya by an
overwhelming majority of votes. ' Russian President Boris Yeltsin responded to the
elections by declaring a State of Emergency in Chechnya on 7 November and by
dispatching Russian troops to Grozny. Dudayev countered Yeltsin by declaring martial
law and mobilizing the National Guard.
When Russian troops arrived at the Grozny airport, they were outnumbered and
easily detained by Chechen forces. Three days later, after the Russian Supreme Soviet
failed to confirm Yeltsin's State of Emergency, the Russian troops detained in Chechnya
were permitted to return to Russia.
Ibid., paragraph 36.
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Accounts vary as to Dudayev's percentage of the vote, between 70 and 90 percent.
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From this point until 1994 Moscow, reluctant to use military force in Chechnya
and preoccupied with political and economic instabilities of its own separate from the
renegade republic of Chechnya, took little action. 52 Edward Kline described the situation
this way:
Russia mainly followed a policy of benign neglect, except in the international
arena where its adamant stance prevented any state from extending diplomatic
recognition to the Chechen Republic. 53
While Moscow was largely, though never entirely, inattentive to the rebellious
republic, civil war continued and Chechnya quickly declined into a "criminal state." This
terminology is intentional; not only had crime rates soared, but also Dudayev himself had
placed a number of criminals in very important assignments. In November 1991, when
he seized power and rapidly built up the National Guard, Dudayev released more than
600 Chechens from their jail cells and placed them into positions in the National Guard
or on his personal staff.
54
The civil war, escalating crime, economic sanctions imposed by Russia, and
growing political destabilization all combined to have a rapidly devastating affect on
Chechnya.
In 1992, Chechnya further antagonized Moscow on three counts. First, by
involving itself in the Georgian civil war, providing asylum to deposed President Zviad
Gamsakhurdia. Then, by sending Chechen forces, led by Shamil Basayev, into
2 The 1993 Russian Constitution listed Chechnya among the 89 "subjects" of the Federation. Its two






Abkhazia to help the Abkhaz fight for independence from Georgia. And finally, by
reports of widespread mistreatment of Russian citizens coming from the more than
250,000 Russians that emigrated from Chechnya between 1991 and 1994. In February
1994, when Tartarstan, since 1992 the only other holdout Russian republic, signed a
treaty to accept Russian sovereignty in exchange for broad autonomy, Moscow refocused
its attention on Chechnya.
By late 1994, it was apparent that Russia was providing support to the pro-
Moscow opponents of Dudayev. Though Russia had long denied its involvement, the
Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK, formerly the KGB) had been running covert
operations in Chechnya that ranged from the issuance of political propaganda to financial
and military assistance for opposition leaders. This became clear on 26 November 1994
when seventy Russian soldiers were captured in Grozny by Dudayev's forces after an
opposition attack failed to overrun the Presidential Palace. The FSK, it turned out, had
recruited the captured soldiers from active duty units.55 Once Russia officially
acknowledged its involvement in the Chechen civil war, the Russian soldiers were
released.
With the failure of covert efforts and probably due, at least in part, to
embarrassment over the captured soldiers, Moscow rapidly advanced its method for
handling the Chechen problem to full-scale war.
Kline, paragraph 49.
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C. THE BEGINNING OF WAR WITH RUSSIA
President Yeltsin's decree of 9 December 1994 ordered the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the FSK jointly "to use all available state means to
ensure the security of the state, the rule of law, civil rights and liberties, the defense of
public order, the fight against crime, and the disarming of all illegal armed formations" in
Chechnya. 56 Two days later, Russia launched a three pronged attack into Chechnya.57
Russia had a much slower, more difficult time with Chechen forces than it had
anticipated. Russian forces ran head-on into a host of problems, most of their own
making. The invasion was poorly planned and too hastily executed, public support had
not been garnered, Russian units were filled with inexperienced, young conscripts, Russia
was not prepared for a prolonged engagement, and a litany of other shortcomings plagued
the Russians. Many Russian units found themselves engaged in combat without much
needed supplies virtually from the onset of hostilities.
Many of the Chechen fighters had combat experience from fighting in
Afghanistan as members of the Soviet army and from fighting as mercenaries in
Abkhazia and Azerbaijan, and were more highly motivated than Russian troops. Russia
had grossly underestimated the Chechens' capability to fight and their resolve to win.
Chechen forces had conducted numerous successful raids on Russian arms depots
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and grenades, but lacked sophisticated anti-air weapons. And since Chechnya's very
limited air assets of just over 100 confiscated aircraft and approximately thirty trained
pilots had been destroyed early in the civil war, Russia possessed only one clear
advantage, air supremacy.
Russian bombardments were extremely heavy particularly in the first 3-4 months
of the war. Frederick Cuny provided the following description of Russian bombardments
into Grozny during the first 2 months of the war:
To put the intensity of firing into perspective, the highest level of firing recorded
in Sarajevo was 3,500 heavy detonations per day. In Grozny in early February, a
colleague of mine counted 4,000 detonations per hour. Only in March did the
Russians diminish their shelling and adopt a strategy of starving out the local
population.
9
Only after Russia came under condemnation as a result of negative publicity and
the findings from humanitarian rights watch groups sent into Chechnya was the intensity
of bombardments decreased. Russian Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergei Kovalev,
headed the first of three humanitarian groups (in December 1994) that reported on the
situation. The second and third watch groups sent in to Chechnya were sponsored by the
OSCE in January and February 1995, respectively.
The first two groups reported gross violations of humanitarian laws with respect
to "indiscriminate attacks" from heavy weapons and aircraft. Kovalev' s group had
estimated "as many as 24,000 civilian deaths between November 25 [1994] and January




Frederick Cuny, "Killing Chechnya," New York Review ofBooks, 6 April 1995, 15-17, 15.
29
and shelling."60 The second report also indicated some incidents of war crimes (looting,
shootings) by Russian soldiers in Grozny. By the third visit in February 1995,
bombardments had been scaled back and the report sighted distribution of Red Cross and
other humanitarian relief shipments, public security, and management of refugees as the
"most urgent problems."
61 The OSCE has continued to maintain a monitoring program in
Chechnya since March 1995.
Aided by the heavy bombardments early on and after repeated assaults, Russian
forces managed to take the Presidential Palace on 1 9 January, but it would be another
month before they controlled most of the heavily damaged capital city. During this time,
intermittent cease-fires were agreed upon as needed to exchange POWs, manage the
dead, and permit humanitarian response efforts by the International Red Cross and other
relief agencies.
Russian forces gained momentum between February and April f995 with
successful assaults on other major Chechen towns and, by early June, Russian forces
where launching assaults into Chechen strongholds in the southern mountain ranges.
Despite unpreparedness, ineffective leadership, and tactical weaknesses, Russia
was poised to finish off the Chechen resistance in early June. Reflecting back on Edward
Kline's quote in the first section of this chapter, it seemed that Russia would once again








By early March 1995, three months into the war, nearly all Chechen fighters had
retreated from Grozny and the capital city was solidly under Russian control. March was
also the month during which the OSCE first established a monitoring mission inside
Chechnya. Simultaneously Sergei Kovalev, Russia's High Commissioner for Human
Rights, who had brought worldwide attention to Russia's excessive use of firepower and
disregard for civilian losses in Chechnya a few months earlier, was dismissed.
During April and May, Russian forces began extending their conquests beyond
Grozny. The towns of Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were seized in March, and Bamut, in
the eastern foothills, was under attack by Russian forces. By the end of March most
Chechen forces had fallen back into the foothills and many town leaders left to fend for
themselves entered into agreements with Russian authorities that required them to
recognize the Provisional Council, turn over their weapons, and refuse safe haven to
Chechen fighters. Towns that failed to adhere to conditions of the agreements risked
attack. One such town, Samaskhi, suffered brutally in a controversial three-day assault
(6-8 April 1995) by Russian forces. The fact that Russian troops denied media and relief
agency personnel entry into the area for several days, and that a few hundred civilians
were killed in the assault, ignited controversy over Russian tactics and brought reprisals
from the West.62
Soon after Samaskhi, Russian forces launched attacks on other Chechen towns




Serzhen-Yurt. Vedeno, Imam Shamil's famous last stronghold and Shamil Basayev's
birthplace, and Shatoy were the only remaining towns completely controlled by Chechen
forces in May 1995, both located high in the mountains. Additionally, the OSCE's initial
efforts to mediate peace talks had failed.
By early June, fighting had reached Vedeno and Russian forces were targeting all
of the remaining mountain strongholds that had previously been safe zones for retreating
Chechen fighters. Vedeno was captured on 4 June and Shatoy fell to Russian forces on
13 June.
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Eleven members of Shamil Basayev's family, to include his sister, were
killed in the fighting at Vedeno. 65 In addition, more than 300,000 citizens of Chechnya
were already reported as refugees in neighboring regions.66 Despite Russia's early
failings and initial gross underestimation of Chechnya's ability to wage war, Russia with
its overwhelming firepower and numeric superiority had gained the decided advantage.
Chechnya was poised for defeat. SIPRI Yearbook 1996 described the situation as
follows:
The overwhelming preponderance of the Russian armed forces in numbers and in
equipment was such that they could not fail steadily to widen their control over
the Chechen territory. By mid- 1995, the fighters on the side of General [Jokhar]
Dudayev, president of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic, were reported to
have been pushed to the mountainous southern part of Chechnya. 7
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The war, however, took a dramatic turn after the 14 June 1995 Chechen raid, led
by Shamil Basayev, on Budennovsk; a Russian town located approximately 50 miles
beyond the Chechen border with a population of about 100,000.
That event unveiled a decisive change in Chechen war tactics. Something was
needed to halt, or at least delay, Russia's military momentum. Budennovsk did just that;
it was the definitive turning point of the war and signaled a shift in the primary focus of
Chechnya's military strategy away from the invading Russian forces to the political
vulnerabilities of Moscow.
/
Anatol Lieven, in Chechnya covering the war as a correspondent for the London
Times, provides a first hand account of the situation just before Budennovsk:
When I visited Serzhen Yurt and Vedeno (along with Sebastian Smith of AFP) in
[May 1995], we saw considerable evidence that Chechen fortunes were at a low
ebb, probably their lowest ebb of the entire war. Ammunition was very short,
many of the men were extremely tired and in some cases morale had begun to
crack. Basayev admitted later that the Chechens had been close to defeat, and
said that as a result he had had unwillingly to adopt the tactic of raids into Russia
and the taking of civilian hostages.68
The raid on Budennovsk marked the first in a series of classic terrorist attacks
against innocent Russian civilians that through extensive media coverage created
widespread fear among the Russian population, turned public opinion against Moscow
for being unable to protect its people from terror, and led to Chechnya's political and,




A. THE TURNING POINT: BUDENNOVSK
1. The Assault: Wednesday, 14 June 1995
Chechen field Commander Shamil Basayev and approximately 100 of his
men, hidden in coffin-filled trucks that were supposedly carrying Russian war dead
home, crossed the Chechen border into the Stavropol region. In Budennovsk the
Chechen fighters dismounted the trucks, divided into small teams of five or six men,
joined up with other Chechen fighters already positioned throughout the town, and took
control of several administrative buildings and private homes. 69 The buildings seized
included a hospital, a maternity clinic, a bank, a communications center, and the town
hall where they raised the green, white and red Chechen flag. Apparently, the only initial
target they were unsuccessful in taking was the building that housed the local internal
affairs department. The Chechens were armed with automatic rifles, machine guns, and
grenade launchers.
Within hours Basayev' s men had burned a number of homes and cars, killed 20
local police officers, shot an unknown number of civilians, and began rounding up
hostages and consolidating them on the upper floors of the hospital. Spectators reported
69
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that the Chechens "drove over people" and "shot peaceful civilians in cold blood." In
all ninety-one people were killed in the initial Chechen attack. That number includes
wounded Russian soldiers that were killed when the hospital was seized.71
Threatening to kill the hostages, Basayev demanded the withdrawal of all Russian
troops from Chechnya and the onset of direct negotiations between Dudayev and Yeltsin.
Throughout the ordeal, the Chechens placed women, some of them pregnant, in the
windows as human shields.
2. The Siege, 15-19 June
Information on the situation in Budennovsk on June 14 was sketchy and many
conflicting accounts of the terrorists' identities and number of hostages were
disseminated until, on the following day, large numbers of Russian anti-terrorist units,
regular soldiers, police and journalists arrived and began a more accurate accounting of
the situation. In his first press conference, held in the hospital basement on June 15,
Basayev reaffirmed his demands of the first day and additionally demanded amnesty for
all Chechen fighters and free elections for Chechnya. 7" Prior to the press conference,
Basayev had ordered the execution of at least five hostages because the journalists did not
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Basayev's men; five hostages were killed for every Chechen fighter that was wounded
and ten were killed for every Chechen that died. 73
From the time of the first press conference on 15 June until the early morning
hours of 17 June, the fourth day of the siege, negotiations took place hourly with no
resolution and only a few incidents of sporadic gunfire. On 17 June, Russian Special
Forces attempted to end the hostage crisis by storming the hospital on two occasions (at 5
a.m. and 2:30 p.m.). Russian units managed to secure the first floor of the hospital but
could not advance to the upper floors where the hostages were being kept because of
heavy Chechen resistance. They were also hampered in their efforts by the Chechen tactic
of placing women holding white sheets into the windows for use as human shields. 74 A
'cease-fire was finally agreed upon and Basayev freed 227 (to include as many as 150
pregnant women) of his approximately 1,500 hostages.
By way of the media that was positioned throughout the town to cover the crisis,
distressed residents of Budennovsk began calling for Prime Minister Victor
Chernomydrin's personal intervention in the negotiation process. Their pleas were not
ignored. The second storming of the hospital was over around 3:15 p.m. and less than
two hours later Chernomydrin made a statement on Russian television. He denounced
the hostage taking, tried to allay fears and assure viewers of a quick resolution, and








The following afternoon, 18 June, Chernomydrin personally negotiated with
Basayev via telephone. Later that day, on Russian television, the Prime Minister of
Russia outlined the agreement he had brokered with Basayev:
For the purpose of releasing the hostages held in the town of Budennovsk, the
government of the Russian Federation, one: guarantees the immediate cessation of
combat activities and bombardment on the territory of Chechnya . . . Two:
appoints a delegation for negotiations on peaceful settlement in the Chechen
republic . . . Three: when all remaining hostages are released, the government will
provide transportation for Basayev and his group to travel to their destination and
guarantee in full their safe arrival in Chechnya . . . 7
Once Russia had capitulated and an agreement was reached, Basayev began
incrementally releasing hostages and continued to do so until the convoy was ready to
take him and his victorious Chechen fighters back to Chechnya.
As a logistics plan was being developed, on 19 June, to meet the conditions of the
agreement, Basayev demanded that "volunteer hostages" be selected to accompany the
Chechens along the convoy route.
As many as 154 hostages were killed during the six day siege of Budennovsk.
3. 20 June, The Chechens Return Home
Basayev had achieved most of his demands, a cease-fire and direct negotiations
between Russia and Chechen President Dudayev. So, on 20 June, he released the
remaining hospital hostages in exchange for trucks, buses, approximately 100 volunteer
hostages comprised mainly of journalists and local government officials, and a
refrigerated truck (for carrying back Chechen dead). Once safely back in Chechnya,
Basayev released the volunteer hostages unharmed.
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As agreed, a cease-fire, although short-lived, went into effect immediately
following the Budennovsk hostage crisis and peace negotiations began between Dudayev
and Russian government officials.
Shamil Basayev, already previously renowned for his combat leadership skills,
was elevated to hero status after the Budennovsk hostage taking. From that point on, he
became the central Chechen figure in the war and systematically perpetuated other acts of
terror against Russian civilian targets that would further deteriorate the Russian political
machine and demoralize the Russian military.
A. PROFILE OF SHAMIL BASAYEV
1. Background
Shamil Basayev was born in 1965 in Vedeno, Chechnya. 77 He finished
secondary school in 1982, then spent two years in the Soviet Army as a fireman. Unable
to get into law school because of poor academic records, he worked on a state farm for
the better part of four years. In 1987, Basayev gained admission into an Agricultural
University and began studies. He was expelled for poor academic performance before
completing his first year. 78
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The early 1990s can best be described as Basayev's mercenary years. For two
and one half years he fought as a Colonel with his fellow Chechens from the
Confederation of Caucasian People in Abkhazia, Georgia. Basayev soon became a well-
respected commander among the Abkhaz resistance forces that were seeking
independence from newly liberated Georgia. Though examples of human rights
violations were common, the actions of his units there fell well short of the type of
terrorist acts that he became notorious for during the Chechen War.
His unit became proudly known as the ''Abkhaz Battalion'' and Basayev was
appointed Deputy Defense Minister in Abkhazia and thus responsible for all front line
actions. While fighting in Abkhazia, Basayev had regular contact with Russian military
officials that were clandestinely assisting the Abkaz in operational planning and
intelligence.
In 1993, Georgia joined the CIS with Russian assurances to help end the conflict
in Abkazia and a prolonged cease-fire began. Before returning home to Chechnya in
1994, Basayev and his unit also fought with the Azeris in the etnnic conflict with
Armenians in the Azerbaijani enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. He and some of his men
also participated in guerilla training in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Mujahedin.
It is unclear whether Basayev and his men were paid by the Russians for their
efforts in Abkhazia or by the Azeri government for fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Basayev most likely funded much of his unit's travel and training during these years from
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criminal activities including robbery, weapons trade, and drug running, activities that he
continued once back in Chechnya.
As a warfighter, Basayev, like his idol Imam Shamil, is known as a tenacious,
effective, charismatic commander. His bravery and "from the front" leadership style are
well respected, but Budennovsk remains the primary propellant of his notoriety.
Following Budennovsk, Dudayev was quoted as saying, "personnel of the
reconnaissance battalion of suicide saboteurs under [Colonel] Shamil's command should
be included on a special list of sons and daughters of the fatherland forever," and
"Basayev is a Chechen national hero and he will be encouraged accordingly."80 Basayev
and five others received the highest Chechen award for their actions in Budennovsk. It is
not surprising then that Budennovsk was not the last time Basayev would participate in or
orchestrate terrorist attacks on Russian non-combatant targets. Nor was it his first act of
terrorism.
2. The Minvody Hijacking
Basayev first emerged as a terrorist a year before reaching acclaim as a warfighter
in Abkazia and shortly after Chechnya had been placed in a "State of Emergency" by
Russia for holding unauthorized elections and declaring its independence from the
Federation in November 1991. 81
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With two accomplices, Basayev hijacked a TU-154 passenger plane in the town
of Mineralnnye Vody. They threatened to blow up the plane if their demand that the
State of Emergency be lifted was not met. They forced the pilot to fly to Turkey. Upon
landing in Ankara, Basayev demanded a press conference. Turkish officials refused to
deal with the terrorists or function as a mediator for Russia and permitted the plane to
return to Grozny, Chechnya. The incident received a lot of media attention and did cause
concern in the Russian public and parliament, although it is uncertain how much of an
impact the incident had on parliament's failure to extend the State of Emergency.
All the passengers were released unharmed.
C. AFTER BUDENNOVSK
A cease-fire went into effect immediately after Budennovsk, and the initial peace
negotiations that followed seemed promising. The military accord signed on 30 July
1995 called for both sides "to pull back 2-4 kilometers from each other," for the gradual
reduction of Russian forces in Chechnya (down to two brigades), for the scheduled
disarmament of Chechen forces, and for the exchange of prisoners. 82 Unfortunately, the
agreement and cease-fire began to disintegrate within weeks. Russia had begun
protracted withdrawals of troops, but progress stalled due to the reluctance of Chechen
forces to surrender their weapons and Dudayev's refusal to extradite Basayev to Russia to
face criminal charges in connection with Budennovsk. In August 1995, Dudayev
" Lieven, 136; and Diane Curran, Fiona Hill, and Elena Kostritsyna, The Search For Peace in Chechnya: A
Sourcebook 1994-1996 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, March 1997), 11. For the full accord,
available only in Russian, see Curran, 174-175.
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disavowed the post-Budennovsk agreements made with Russia less than a month
earlier.
83
Basayev quickly followed these events with threats of future terrorist attacks
against Russian non-combatant targets, only this time much closer to the heart of mother
Russia. During an interview on Polish radio, on 21 October 1995, Basayev said:
If war operations begin again, if the Russian side uses force to put pressure on
Chechnya, I have said unambiguously and I repeat once again: we do not intend
to fight longer on our own territory. It's enough. After all, only the mountains
remain untouched here. I have radioactive material. This is a good weapon. I
will spray it anywhere in the centre of Moscow and to the glory of God I will turn
that city into an eternal desert. That can be done. With this, everything we have
experienced, everything they have done here, can be revenged. If the Russians
lengthen this war, we will have to resort to what I have been speaking of. 84
D. BASAYEV'S GIFT TO MOSCOW
On 8 November 1995, in a taped news conference in Chechnya, Basayev told
Moscow reporter Yelena Masyuk that he had a "gift" or "present" for Moscow of some
radioactive material.
85 The television executives back in Moscow would not report the
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threat for lack of confirmation, so Masyuk returned to Chechnya and Basayev. This time,
he told her that a radioactive container had been flown into Moscow by "friends" and
placed in the Izmailovsky Park, and he provided her with directions to the container.
Izmailovsky Park, a former summer residence for the czars, consists of three
thousand acres that now house designated areas for public use that include an open-air
theater, fairgrounds, and a popular flea market.
When Masyuk returned to the park on 1 3 November, she and a friend looked
around the park themselves, not finding anything. After searching for the package
herself, Masyuk notified authorities in the Federal Security Bureau (FSB).
Basayev' s "people" could not believe that the container had not been found.
Some Chechens told Masyuk that Basayev was suspicious of her trustworthiness and that
he suspected she had found the container, turned it over to Russian authorities, and failed
to report it in the news. It was rumored that some Chechens were making threats against
her.
Masyuk returned to the park on 23 November, "followed Basayev' s plan
precisely," and found the container buried under a thin covering of snow. It was in a 32-
kilogram case, or bag, and wrapped in plastic. Accounts of the package's radioactivity
vary, but all indicate that the emissions well exceeded normal, acceptable levels.87
It turned out that the container held Cesium 137, which is used in cancer research
and therapy. Russian officials reported that the material posed no threat to the general
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public because an individual would have to come within one meter of the package to
become exposed to potentially harmful levels of radiation. 88
It is not clear if the authorities notified by Masyuk on 1 3 November ever looked
for the "present." The container apparently sat covered by snow in the public park for
two to three weeks.
The Russian populace was not easily soothed by news from the Kremlin that the
package was harmless, and events that seemed a recreation of Budennovsk just a few
weeks later continued to drive public opinion against a continuation of war with
Chechnya.
E. KIZLYAR AND PERVOMAYSKOYE
Kizlyar is a Russian town in Dagestan ten miles from the Chechen border. 89 It
has a population of approximately fifty thousand. In the early morning hours of 9
January 1996, in what was "almost an exact replica of the June raid on Budennovsk," 256
Chechen fighters raided the town. 90 This time Chechen Commander Salman Raduyev, a
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relative of President Dudayev, led the raid. 91
As in Budennovsk, the Chechen fighters entered the town in trucks, dismounted
and moved in teams to predetermined locations throughout the town. 92 Raduyev and his
men destroyed two helicopters and a landing pad at the Kizlyar airfield before seizing the
town hospital. By daybreak, the Chechens had forced hundreds of civilians out of nearby
apartments and were holding as many as 2,000 hostages in the hospital. As did Basayev
in Budennovsk, Raduyev used the hostages as human shields, threatened to kill hostages
if any of his men were shot, and demanded the withdrawal of all Russian troops from
Chechnya.
From interviews with hostages, the New York News Service provided this
account of the Kizlyar raid:
By 6:30 the rebels had herded scores of people into [the] hospital while many
of their group battled in the frigid streets near the railroad station. Initial
casualties were heavy, especially after a skirmish at a local army outpost, with at
least 43 people on both sides dying that first day.
By 8:30 the Chechens had seized the maternity department of the hospital and
an apartment house next to it where employees live. Nurses crowded around
women who were giving birth, trying to protect them. Many hostages were
immediately pushed into windows to act as shields. Many of them ripped their
own white bed sheets and waved them furiously, hoping that the Russian troops
would hold their fire. 93
Lieven, 138; Meek, paragraph 1 1; Specter, paragraph 9; and "Chechen Surprise: Repetition," paragraph
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In addition to twenty-five Russian citizens that were killed in the initial raid,
Chechen gunmen killed two of the hostages they were holding in the hospital on 9
January.
94
After spending one night in the hospital, Raduyev piled into buses with 165
hostages and started toward the Chechen border. Their path was halted when helicopter
fire heavily damaged a bridge in their path near the town of Pervomayskoye. The
Chechens managed to take another 100 civilians and 37 militiamen hostage and moved
into buildings within the town.
Although Raduyev did release a small number of women hostages, negotiations
over the next four days showed little progress toward resolving the standoff. Chechen
President Dudayev acknowledged ordering the raid; Russian Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin vowed this time "to punish the Chechen 'bandits.'" 5 Russian security
chief Mikhail Barsukov offered the Chechens safe passage home in exchange for the
release of all remaining hostages and the surrender of all weapons. Raduyev, not
surprisingly, refused to release the hostages, surrender his weapons, or accept safe
passage unless provided with volunteer hostages from among journalists and local
politicians. Throughout these four days Russian officials set deadlines by which they
demanded Raduyev release hostages, and each time Raduyev responded by opening fire
on Russian troops. Four Russians were wounded in these exchanges.96
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Russian forces began to attack Chechen positions on 15 January. The fighting
intensified the following day as Russian forces began clearing the town house by house.
By 18 January, twenty-three hostages had been freed and the Chechens were completely
surrounded by Russian forces and specialized antiterrorist units.
Chechen reinforcements, sent by Dudayev, arrived on the 18 th and attempted to
break through the perimeter. They were beaten back, but managed to aid a number of the
Chechen fighters, to include Rudayev, in escaping. 97
In the fighting, the town of Pervomayskoye was decimated. As justification for
the heavy assault and vast destruction of Pervomayskoye, Russian Interior Minister
Anatoly Kulikov cited intercepted communications between Raduyev and Grozny that
discussed plans to begin killing hostages. That the Chechens possessed the ability to
communicate with Grozny throughout the standoff was confirmed later in hostage
interviews. According to hostage accounts, the Chechens conducted communications
over radio and satellite telephone, and were capable of intercepting Russian radio
communications. The timely arrival of Chechen reinforcements and Raduyev' s escape
were likely aided by these capabilities.
The standoff was over by the morning on 19 January. As many as 150 Chechen
fighters were killed and Russian authorities captured another thirty. Forty hostages were
killed in the ordeal.
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Dudayev's dispatch of reinforcements to Pervomayskoye was not the only
Chechen effort to aid Radiiyev. Basayev launched a new attack on Grozny on 14 January
during which twenty-nine Russians were taken hostage from a nearby power station, and
"friends" of Basayev hijacked a Turkish ferry in the Black Sea on 16 January. In both of
these instances, the hostages were held under the demand that Raduyev and his men be
allowed to leave Pervomayskoye with their hostages.
Raduyev and the other Chechens that managed to escape on 19 January 1996 took
with them 60 hostages. Those hostages were held in Novogrozny, Chechnya, along with
the twenty-nine hostages taken from the power station. In interviews held in Novogrozny
in the days following Pervomayskoye, Raduyev and Shamil Basayev said that they would
exchange the civilian hostages for the Chechen fighters captured in Pervomayskoye.
Some of the hostages were even presented to the visiting journalists and made positive
statements about their Chechen captors and the treatment they were receiving." Of
course, those statements in all probability were coerced.
On 23 January 1996, Chechnya's Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Asian
Maskhadov, clarified that all the Dagestani hostages would be released without
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F. THE HIJACKING OF A TURKISH FERRY
Late at night on 1 6 January 1 996, while Raduyev and federal troops were at a
standoff in Pervomayskoye, seven heavily-armed Chechen sympathizers with TNT
strapped to their bodies hijacked the Turkish ferry Avrazya in the Black Sea port of
Trabzon, taking 151 passengers (mostly Russians) and 40 crew members hostage. 101 The
port facility's police chief was wounded trying to deter the hijackers.
All seven hijackers were Turks who had ties to Abkazia and Chechnya. The
leader, Muhammad Toksan, is of Abkaz descent and fought with Shamil Basayev in
Abkazia, and possibly in Chechnya. 102 It was reported later that the ferry captain had
also fought with Basayev in Abkazia and may have conspired with the hijackers. 103
Under threats that the Russian passengers would be shot or that the ship would be
blown up, the hijackers demanded that the Chechen fighters in Pervomayskoye be
permitted safe return to Chechnya and that Russian forces be withdrawn from the region.
Throughout the seventy-two hour ordeal, the ferry traveled west toward Istanbul
and anchored off shore, flanked by Turkish coast guard vessels at all times. Muhammad
maintained constant communications with Turkish negotiators and the Turkish media.
Primary sources for the ferry hijacking section include Stephen Kinzer, "72 Hour Hostage Crisis On the
Black Sea Ends Without Bloodshed" (New York Times News Service), 20 January 1996, 31 paragraphs;
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Raduyev Operation," Komsomolskaya Pravada (Moscow), 31 January 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-022, 1
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One television reporter was even transported onto the ferry and spent 24 hours
conducting interviews. During interviews, Muhammad described himself and his men as
loyal "Chechen resistance fighters." 104
Muhammad was very pleased with the extensive media coverage his operation
received and the public reaction it generated. 105 Hundreds of demonstrators, some of
whom had traveled for hours, gathered in Istanbul in clear view of the anchored ferry.
Comprised of people from the Caucasus, Muslim Turks and other sympathizers, the
crowds chanted pro-Chechen, anti-Russian slogans, waved signs and Chechen flags, and
"encouraged the hijackers not to surrender." 106 The hijackers responded to their
supporters with flashlights and by maneuvering the ferry.
On 19 January, satisfied by the media coverage and the crowds of Chechen
supporters, the hijackers surrendered to Turkish officials and the hostages were released.
Basayev himself later admitted, in an interview with a correspondent from the
Moscow Komsomolskaya Pravda, his involvement in planning the hijacking operation
and his seeming regret that the hijackers surrendered so easily. Basayev said:
Three of the group who seized the ship are. old friends of mine, we fought together
in Abkhazia. Not so long ago they were my guests. And we discussed a plan to
seize a ship. But I don't know why they gave themselves up without taking the
matter to its conclusion.
107
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G. RUSSIA TRIES BUT CANNOT RECOVER
The raid on Budennovsk in June 1995 capitalized on the political vulnerabilities
of Moscow, generated tremendous fear among Russian citizens, and eliminated popular
support for Russia's war effort. The placement of a radioactive package in the heart of
Moscow, the raid on Kizlyar and its aftermath in Pervomayskoye, and the hijacking of a
Turkish ferry which occurred in rapid succession after Budennovsk, between November
1995 and late January 1996, further heightened anxieties and stymied the Russian war
effort. The Russian army was unable to recover the tactical momentum that it had
enjoyed in early June 1995.
Russian units lost ground and lost heart in those seven months, mid-June 1995
through late January 1996. Chechen citizens on the other hand, bolstered by the recent
military successes, achieved renewed confidence. From the time of Budennovsk until the
last Russian troops left Chechnya in January 1997, separatist demonstrations grew ever
more common in Grozny. To offer an example from Lieven:
On Chechen Independence Day, 6 September 1995, some 3,000 Chechens
gathered in the square before the site of the former presidential headquarters,
carrying placards denouncing Russia and supporting Dudayev. Almost every day
during the talks in the OSCE compound in Grozny, Russian generals had to run
the gauntlet of booing and chanting demonstrators. For reasons that are not clear,
the Russian Army made very little attempt to stop these rallies or arrest those
responsible.
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Also during that period, Chechen fighters, aided by townspeople, had easily re-
infiltrated most Chechen towns by carefully avoiding Russian posts on the periphery.




routine street patrols by Russian troops. By March 1996, Chechen forces had regained
control of some towns and were launching preemptive assaults to reclaim parts of the
capital city.
Moreover, the problems that had plagued Russian forces all along - combat
inexperience, ineffective leadership, inability to resupply combat units, and poor morale -
were now magnified under the lens of Moscow's political instability, indecisiveness, and
gamesmanship. Russian presidential elections were scheduled for 16 June 1996 and
President Yeltsin had good reason to be concerned.
Russian opinion polls in March and April 1996 showed that fifty-two percent of
Russians favored "an unconditional pull-out of Russian forces from Chechnya," and fifty-
seven percent favored "direct talks between Yeltsin and Dudayev." 109 Yeltsin desperately
needed to convince the Russian public that he was seriously seeking an end to the war in
Chechnya.
In March, Yeltsin announced another cease-fire and offered to talk with Dudayev
and seek a resolution to the conflict. Dudayev was conscious of Yeltsin's political
motives and his pre-election vulnerabilities, and he had seen the tactical advantage swing
back in Chechnya's direction. A temporary peace had no allure for Dudayev who could
clearly see Chechnya's opportunity for a total victory. Instead of accepting Yeltsin's
offer, Dudayev capitalized on the situation. In late March and through mid-April 1996,
Chechen forces conducted a number of highly successful assaults and ambushes against




At this point, it seemed that something very dramatic would need to happen for
Yeltsin to show progress in Chechnya or win re-election. Dudayev's death served both
ends.
1. Dudayev Is Killed and Yandarbiyev Succeeds the Presidency
Russia would, of course, have welcomed Dudayev's demise at any time during
the war, but his death could not have come at a better time for Yeltsin. His re-election
hopes depended on a concerted peace initiative in Chechnya and Dudayev was an
obstinate barrier. So, when Chechen leaders, in late April 1996, confirmed that Jokhar
Dudayev was dead, both President Yeltsin and Russian morale received a much-needed
boost.
Dudayev was killed on or about 22 April in the village of Gekhi-chu (near
Grozny) by rocket fire from Russian aircraft that had apparently targeted his satellite
telephone transmissions. Reportedly, Dudayev was in conversation with Russian
negotiators when the attack took place. 110
Whether or not Dudayev had personally ordered the use of terrorism is unclear,
but his knowledge in advance of the operations was certain. Members of his personal
staff participated in the raid on Budennovsk, and Raduyev surely would have told his
relative and mentor about the plans for Kizlyar. Even if Dudayev did not order any of the
attacks, he certainly helped perpetuate them by his formal support to and protection of the




not resume terrorist attacks after his death even when Moscow reneged a subsequent
cease-fire agreement and stepped up its attacks on Chechen positions in July 1996.
Although it was certainly a blow to Chechnya, Dudayev's death most assuredly
contributed to the eventual peace. Chechen Vice-President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev
succeeded him. It is very unlikely that Dudayev, who was known to be irascible, ill
tempered and unpredictable, would have agreed to a cease-fire before Russian elections
as Yandarbiyev did. in In fact, on 1 May 1996, Yandarbiyev made the offer to renew
peace negotiations with Moscow, under OSCE mediation.
A three-day cease-fire began in late May during which Yandarbiyev traveled to
Moscow and met with Yeltsin. Though their meeting was less than cordial, a new
agreement was signed that extended the cease-fire and promoted continued peace efforts.
On 28 May, Yeltsin for the first time during the war visited the Russian controlled
airfield near Grozny. It was quite obviously a political gesture and Yeltsin
returned to Moscow after only a few hours in Chechnya. 112
In less than two weeks, the OSCE had brokered a peace agreement between the
two sides and Yeltsin was able to tell the Russian voters that Russian troop withdrawals
from Chechnya would begin on 25 June 1996. The agreement signed in the Ingushestian
town of Nazran on 10 June, outlined a cease-fire, demilitarization, the formation of joint
groups for policing and monitoring operations, and the withdrawal of Russian forces by
the end of August.
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2. Russia's Final Effort and Chechnya's Response
Dudayev's death, the successful cease-fire and Yeltsin's promise to the Russian
people of peace in Chechnya were enough to tip the electoral scales in Yeltsin's favor and
win him re-election. Despite strong public and parliamentary support for ending the war,
political necessity and popular opinion were no longer immediate concerns for Yeltsin.
vCiting violations of the cease-fire agreement by Chechen forces, Moscow ordered the
resumption of large-scale attacks against Chechen positions virtually as soon as the
ballots were tabulated in early July 1996.
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Russian forces, however, had been unable to recover from the previous year of
dramatic setbacks and humiliation. Their defeat began when Budennovsk stripped their
momentum and the ensuing year had crippled their ability and willingness to fight on.
Russia was beaten.
Timed to coincide with Yeltsin's inaugural celebration, Chechen forces massed
for the largest Chechen offensive of the war. On 6 August 1996, Chechen forces
simultaneously assaulted the Russian occupied towns of Gudermes, Argun, and Grozny.
As described by Anatol Lieven in his recently published book, Chechnya: Tombstone of
Russian Power, the Chechen victory was quick and decisive.
By the evening of the second day, most of the Russian forces around Grozny were
back to the positions they had occupied before the first Russian assault in
December 1994, twenty months before. The Chechens also occupied the centres
of Gudermes and Argun. Some 494 Russian soldiers were killed in the August
battle in Grozny alone, with 1,407 wounded and 182 missing or captured - figures
which recall the worst days of the initial storm in January 1995. Eighteen tanks
and 69 armoured personnel carriers were destroyed or captured. This very signal
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defeat presented Russians with the choice of either starting the whole war over
again, beginning with a new and bloody storm of Grozny, or of effectively
surrendering in return for peace.
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Nearly all Russians, to include most government officials, were unwilling to
relive the events of the war, the last 14 months especially, and were ready for peace at
any cost.
3. Alexander Lebed Negotiates an End to the Chechen War
Shortly after finishing third in the first round of the Russian presidential elections,
J
Alexander Lebed, a retired Soviet Army General, was appointed by Yeltsin as Security
Council Secretary and National Security Aide on 18 June 1996. Lebed immediately
vowed to "personally take charge of the Chechen peace negotiations." 115 Lebed was
outspoken in his opposition of the war from the very beginning and his presidential
campaign slogan was, "Others start wars, he ends them." 116
On 10 August, Lebed took over as Presidential Envoy to Chechnya and two days
later met with Chechen Chief of Staff Asian Maskhadov in the Dagestan town of Novye
Atagi. Lebed and Maskhadov, also retired from the Soviet Army (as a Colonel),
established a good rapport from their very first meeting and immediately agreed to a
period of cease-fire to manage the dead and wounded and permit relief to civilians. The









Yeltsin's vocal disapproval of Lebed and an unfulfilled threat by the Russian
military commander, General Pulikovsky, to renew bombardments on Grozny
remarkably did not derail peace efforts this time. 117 In actuality, those actions may have
hastened the negotiators toward a peace settlement. Lebed and Maskhadov quickly
signed an interim agreement, "On Urgent Measures to Stop Fire and Combat Operations
in the City of Grozny and on the Territory of Chechnya," on 22 August. 118 It was
followed nine days later by the signing of the "Russian-Chechen Truce Agreement:
Principles for Determining the Fundamentals of Relations Between the Russian
Federation and the Chechen Republic." The final peace accord was signed on 31 August
1996 in Khasavyurt, Dagestan. 119
The Truce Agreement called for establishment of a joint commission and re-
validated the Nazran agreement, but delayed determination of Chechnya's independence
for five years. The actual statement on the political status of Chechnya is contained in
paragraph 1 of the Agreement and reads as follows:
The treaty regulating the basis fundamentals of relations between the Russian
Federation and the Chechen Republic, to be governed by the universally accepted
principles and norms of the international law, shall have been reached prior to 3
1
December, 2001. 120
The war was over, and if Russian officials were reluctant to acknowledge
Bill Powell, "Someone's Finally in Charge," Newsweek, 2 September 1996, 6 paragraphs, paragraphs 2
and 4; Baev, 55; and Curran, 47.
Curran, 207; for complete document (English translation).
Ibid., 208; for complete document (English translation). The date on the Truce Agreement is 25 August




that Chechnya had won the war, they could not deny Russia's resounding defeat. Pavel
Baev succinctly summarized the atmosphere in Moscow in his book, Russia 's Policies in
the Caucasus.
The peace accord [Lebed] struck on 30 August was in fact a plain recognition of
Russia's military and political defeat. Few in the Russian leadership showed any
enthusiasm about this 'capitulation', but the alternative - renewal of military
operations - was clearly unacceptable, so the accord was officially confirmed. 121
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Chechen President Yandarbiyev meet
in Moscow in early October to sign a joint declaration consolidating the agreements made
previously by Lebed and Maskhadov. Yet the issue of whether or not Russia would
maintain some military presence in Chechnya lingered until November when it was
agreed that all Russian troops would be out of Chechnya on or before 20 January 1997.
The peace in Chechnya did not belay Yeltsin's displeasure with and resentment
for Lebed. Yeltsin fired him on 17 October 1996. Two days later, Yandarbiyev
appointed Maskhadov as Prime Minister of Chechnya. Today, Maskhadov is the





In their recently published book, Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal recount this
story of a disoriented elderly Dagestani women who encountered Shamil Basayev during
the initial raid on Budennovsk.
The Chechens formed a huge column of hundreds of people along the street,
urging them along at gunpoint, shooting over their heads to force back the
Russian police. In a moment of black comedy, Basayev remembers an old
woman stepping out of her gate staring around at the commotion. 'There's one
old granny in a house on the way to the hospital. People are aware of what's
going on, they all are crouching down, fighting is going on, the Russians are
shooting and we are shooting, and the old woman comes out on to the street, and
stands there, and I say, "Grandma, stop, come over here." She says, "Little son,
what's going on, are you making a movie?" I say, "Yes, yes we are filming,
Grandma, it's a war," and she comes quickly over.' 122
Presumably, "Grandma" became one of Basayev's more than 1,500 hostages.
That is where the story ends. What happened to Grandma is unclear; she is but an
amusing memory for a terrorist. Hopefully, she is today safe in her Budennovsk home
trying still to forget the ordeal or telling stories of it herself. If the latter is true, her
stories in all likelihood are not amusing. Of course, she could have been one of the more
than 150 Russian citizens killed in Budennovsk. In the eyes of Basayev, that would be
justifiable.
When you combine a callous disregard for generally accepted customs and
humanitarian laws and the calculated ruthlessness of a terrorist with the warfighting
talents of a skillful, brave, and seasoned military commander, you have Shamil Basayev.
The contradictions in such a personality are paradoxical. On the one hand, honorable and
" Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York and London: New
York University Press, 1998), 258.
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on the other, despicable. The military commander is obligated to protect noncombatants
inasmuch as war will allow. The terrorist is targeting the very same noncombatants (to
include disoriented old ladies).
Terrorism has achieved honored status in Chechnya time and time again since
June 1995: when Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin negotiated on live
television with Basayev and agreed to nearly all of his demands; when Basayev and his
fighters returned home to Chechnya and a hero's welcome; when Dudayev heralded and
rewarded participants of the Budennovsk operation; when Russia conceded defeat; and
when Basayev became the Chechen Prime Minister earlier this year. It achieved honored
status among Chechens, among Muslims, and among some less likely candidates.
Anatol Lieven, the London reporter who frequently interviewed Basayev and was
on occasion a personal guest of his, acknowledges the hostage raid on Budennovsk as
"obviously an act of terrorism by the usual definition," then goes on to say that it was
also "an act of enormous daring." " In the introduction of his book, he admits to having
formed a "deep admiration" for the Chechens and expresses his desire to honor their
"courage and tenacity" while maintaining "due scholarly and journalistic objectivity." 124
Raymond Finch, a United States Army officer writing for the Foreign Military Studies
Office in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is certainly conscious of the significant implications
of the Chechen war, but he is reluctant to call Basayev a terrorist (attributing such






tries to quantify this perception, it seems clear that Finch, too, has developed admiration
for Basayev. The following comment was footnoted in one of Finch's articles:
This article's intent is not to romanticize Shamil Basayev' s martial exploits. His
methods are cruel and vicious and often violate recognized laws of warfare.
However, he should not be demonized. When cast in the light of Chechen
independence, his actions are courageous and praiseworthy. 125
As discussed in the introduction, these kinds of mixed appraisals are not
uncommon "when actors do not use terrorism exclusively." " Audiences can react to
discriminate use of terrorism with "both admiration for its daring and revulsion at its
cruelty."
127 The campaign of terror employed by Chechen combatants, though
unrelenting for seven months, can be considered discriminate because Chechnya did not
resort to terrorism until the situation was desperate in June 1995. Then later when the
Russian army was no longer capable of regaining the upper hand, Chechnya abandoned
terrorism and resumed conventional tactics in the final months of the war.
In cases where terrorism is used discriminately and camouflaged by war, it is not
hard to image how those people that the terrorist represents and even some onlookers can
become enamoured with a character like Shamil Basayev. Neither is it very surprising,
albeit somewhat disappointing by implication, that Basayev has risen to such prominence
as a result of the planning, execution and orchestration of terrorism. "To engage in
warfare is a justification for terrorism as well as a claim to powerful status." 128
125
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Whatever the justification, terrorism can be quite easily distinguished from acts of
warfare; terrorism does not resemble war. "Targets of military or defensive value to the
enemy are rarely the targets of terrorism; to the contrary, terrorists seem to prefer
noncombatants." 129 Shamil Basayev avoided or circumvented by bribe or cunning
numerous military targets along the way to Budennovsk. He was not looking for an
unsuspecting military target. Basayev was on a terrorist mission; he was looking for
noncombatants. Budennovsk in no way could be construed as a military target.
A perceptive reporter once posed the difficult question of perceptions on terrorism
to Emil Pain, former head of the Russian Federation's Working Group for Ending
Hostilities and Settling the Situation in the Chechen Republic. Here is the question and
Pain's answer:
Everyone condemns terrorism, but people can interpret the same act and many
different phenomena in different ways - some as an act of terrorism, others as a
heroic act carried out for the good of their people. How do we tackle this?
Political terrorism always hides behind slogans about protecting the interests
of its people or downtrodden social group. And in that sense there is no
difference between the IRA, the Palestinian Hamas, or the Chechen gunman. Just
as there is no difference in that they almost always represent a political minority.
. . . Political demagoguery about the "good of the people" and the "freedom
struggle" cannot overshadow the fact that terrorism is one of the most deformed
phenomena of modern times. The deliberate use of force against unarmed
civilians to resolve political tasks - that is what distinguishes terrorism from other
crimes. Under the laws of any country this evil undertaking is punished more






"Emil Pain Remarks on Cairo Summit, Terrorism in Chechnya," Rossiyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 14 March
1996, FBIS-SOV-96-051, 15 paragraphs, paragraphs 6 and 7.
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In the case of Chechnya, however, terrorism was not punished; it was rewarded,
and the terrorists garnered power from their exploits. The implications of this very
prominent aspect of the Chechen war lay in the "self-perpetuating dynamic" of
terrorism.
131
A. WHY DID CHECHNYA RESORT TO TERROR AS A TACTIC OF WAR?
Chechens are often referenced in connection with 'bandit traditions' and a
'raiding heritage' (recall the quote from Solzhenitsyn in the historical background section
of Chapter II). Substantial evidence does exist to support the assertion that thievery and
raiding have historically been part of the Chechen landscape. Raiding was once the
accepted means for young Chechen men to find a wife and obtain property, and Chechens
will generally speak very freely and frankly about their criminal activities, "for there is
no implication of guilt or apology." 132
That heritage and those traditions had manifested themselves in modem Chechnya
before the war, in organized crime and "brigandage pure and simple." 133 The collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Chechen revolution of 1991 only increased the opportunities for
criminals in Chechnya, as in all parts of the former Soviet Union. 134 Dudayev and
Basayev both made good use of criminals in their government capacities, and both
certainly profited individually from the criminal climate in Chechnya before the war.








Maskhadov tries to dispel the notion that Chechens are bandits and, ironically,
Basayev today uses that very term to describe the Chechen kidnapping rings operating in
the North Caucasus region. However, Chechen culture must be considered a contributing
factor in Chechnya's acceptance of terrorism as a means of achieving independence, even
if it was not the critical variable in Chechnya's decision to employ terrorism. Shamil
Basayev has to be considered the key variable when evaluating Chechnya's use of
terrorism during the war. Without denying his demonstrated warfighting capabilities,
remember that Basayev showed his talents for terrorism before he became a warfighter;
remember Minvody. It cannot be said with certainty, but it is unlikely that Dudayev,
Maskhadov, or Raduyev would have initiated terrorism on their own.
Dudayev was actively soliciting international recognition and intervention, the
hopes of which were lost following the first terrorist action at Budennovsk. Maskhadov
most certainly would not have turned to terrorism; he seems too noble. And Kizlyar was
virtually a carbon copy of Budennovsk; it is unlikely that Raduyev would have conceived
of such a large-scale terrorist operation on his own.
The success of Budennovsk coupled with the tolerance for criminality inherent in
the Chechen culture set a climate that fostered the seven-month campaign that followed.
Of course, Basayev personally planned and directed all of the terrorist activities during
that period, with the possible exception of the raid on Kizlyar.
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B. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHECHNYA AND FOR
FUTURE WARFARE?
1. The Implications for Chechnya
Shortly after Budennovsk, while still reeling from his success, Basayev
made this statement:
The main thing is that I'd opened the bottle and let the genie out. People won't
need me now, they know what to do. People have now got the taste of it. They
understand that it is better to have a war in Russia than at home in Chechnya. 135
Basayev was referring to other Chechen commanders and fighters when he made
this comment, but more than they had gotten 'a taste of it.' Chechnya is living with what
it wrought. Dudayev's government came to power by force and was funded through the
sale of weapons seized from Russian arms depots, drug trafficking, and robbery.
Basayev speaks freely of his participation in all of these exploits as a means of funding
the travel, expenses, and training of his military units. Before the war, after Basayev
stopped the casual and uncontrolled raiding of Chechen railways, his own fighters began
systematically raiding trains filled with foreign passengers transiting through Chechnya.
Today Chechnya is overflowing with terrorism and crime. 136 Kidnappings,
some politically motivated but most prompted purely by the prospect of ransoms, are a
near daily occurrence in Chechnya. The situation is out of control. All international
humanitarian groups have abandoned Chechnya because of attacks against aid workers.
"Basayev Surprised by Chernomyrdin's Handling of Budennovsk," Moscow NTV, 26 June 1995, FBIS-
SOV-95-123, 19 paragraphs, paragraph 12.
1
For crime statistics see "Chechnya Situation Report 01-30 Apr 1997," UN Department of Humanitarian
Affairs, 30 April 1997, 29 paragraphs; "Red Cross Killing Seen as Pursuing Unclear Long-Term Goals,"
Segodnya (Moscow), 18 December 1996, 5 paragraphs; Carlotta Gall, "Game of Human Pawns," The
Moscow Times, 7 March, 1998, 40 paragraphs.
65
In the most serious incident, in December 1996, six of the fifteen Red Cross workers
stationed in Novye Atagi were killed, assassination style, while they slept. 137
Understandably, the Red Cross pulled its remaining workers out of Chechnya the
following day. Firefights with Russian guards along the border are common, as are
1 ^8
indiscriminate bombings throughout the region. Hundreds of people have been
kidnapped in Chechnya since the end of the war to include foreign aid workers and
journalists for whom the captors have netted "an estimated $20 million." Both
Maskhadov and Basayev acknowledge that the crime, and the kidnappings in particular,
cast Chechnya in a bad light internationally and hamper the potential for foreign
investments. Basayev, now the Prime Minister, has taken on the task of curtailing crime
and putting a stop to terrorism. Of course, it is almost perverse that Chechnya's anti-
terrorist unit reports to Basayev and is filled with former members of his command, many
of whom are, like Basayev, still wanted by Russia on charges of hostage taking during
the war.
140
v Today, Chechnya has its independence, essentially. It does not participate in the
Russian government; its two parliamentary seats remain vacant. In fact, Chechnya does
not recognize Moscow at all, except when it serves Chechen ends (as in the establishment
of trade and oil transit agreements), and Moscow is in no position to do much about the
situation. Whether or not Maskhadov and Basayev can effect controls in Chechnya
137
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Gall, "Game of Human Pawns," paragraph 6.
140
Ibid., paragraphs 9 and 10.
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remains to be seen, but in light of the situation as a whole perhaps Moscow should cut its
losses and grant Chechnya full independence.
2. The Implications for Future Warfare
The implications of the Chechen war extend well beyond Chechnya and Russia,
and the terrorism factor of the war, in all probability, will be perpetuated onto the world
in future regional wars. The small Chechen wolf soundly defeated the big Russian bison
and, without doubt, other wolves were taking note. United States Marine Corps
Commandant Charles Krulak has surmised the situation very aptly and with this succinct
comment places American warfighters on their mark: "Future war is most likely not the
son of Desert Storm; rather, it will be the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya." 141
In Somalia, American forces were targeted by warlord clans who never behaved
like conventional forces. That was difficult enough to deal with, and the lessons are
being heeded. Haiti and Bosnia saw much improved force protection. Chechnya
presented a different scenario that more closely resembles Vietnam: an adaptable army
trained, led, and skilled in conventional warfare that holds in its arsenal of
unconventional tactics the very real potential of classic terrorism for use against
noncombatant targets. The military prowess of Basayev and Maskhadov, and other
Chechen commanders, is here recognized, but it was not their military skill, in
conventional terms, that won the war. Chechnya won the war by taking civilian hostages.
The Russian Army was disarmed by the political ramifications of Budennovsk, Kizlyar
and Pervomayskoye and the other more varied, smaller scale acts of terrorism, all of
^
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which targeted noncombatants. The United States and other large, conventional
militaries must prepare to meet the Shamil Basayev of tomorrow. To handle situations
like Russia found itself in, the following actions are prudent and all too obvious:
• United States forces must train for handling policing actions, like civilian
hostage takings, that may occur in or near the war zone in the absence of, or
until such time as, adequate policing agencies can be brought into place.
• The intelligence assessment provided to commanders and the development of
Essential Elements of Information must be expanded to prepare American
units for contact with terrorist elements attached to, in support of, or operating
separately but in the vicinity of the recognized enemy.
• Counterintelligence across the spectrum of intelligence fields must be utilized
to deprive the hostage takers of battlefield information during negotiations so
as to permit a continuation of the war effort.
• Staff operations elements must develop a cooperative rapport with media
representatives in the war zone. Such a relationship can reduce the enemy's
access to information and preclude the premature release of information that is
vital to the war effort until a more suitable time without denying freedom of
the press. (Desert Storm showed a willingness among many media
representatives to cooperate with military planners so long as the relationship
was forthright and reciprocal.)
Under no circumstances should the war effort be suspended. The enemy will
likely resort to terrorism once the situation becomes desperate, as did the Chechens, and
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when they are at their most vulnerable. That may be precisely the time to strengthen
attacks, not to back off as the Russian army was forced to do.
C. HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS THE USE OF TERRORISM TO
CHECHNYA'S VICTORY?
Chechnya came back from the brink of a decisive military defeat by the Russian
Army in June 1995. Despite a gamut of problems and a protracted struggle to seize its
initial objective, Grozny, the capital city, Russian forces had Chechen fighters on the run
and running out of places to go. The Chechens fought resiliently but were greatly
outnumbered and had taken a beating from Russian bombardments. Pushed deep into the
southern mountains, with their last strongholds under attack from advancing forces, the
Chechen situation was desperate.
Then, on 14 June 1995, the hostage raid on Budennovsk changed everything.
Chechnya effectively shifted the focus of its military strategy away from the Russian
forces inside Chechnya to the political vulnerabilities of Moscow and the fears of the
Russian people. The images of horrified hostages and corpses, and stories of inept
attempts by Russian officials to negotiate a resolution were broadcast internationally by a
throng of reporters who converged on Budennovsk and played right into Basayev's hand.
After attempts to free the hostages by force failed, Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin, in an unprecedented move, negotiated on live television with Basayev
and agreed to every demand except the full removal of Russian forces from Chechnya.
Basayev was given volunteer hostages and safe passage back to Chechnya where the
cease-fire was already in effect. The Chechen combatants had resorted to classic terrorist
tactics with resounding success and returned home to a hero's welcome.
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Though the subsequent cease fire agreement, signed on 30 July 1995, did not last
very long, it gave the Chechens an opportunity to regroup and to plan their next move.
Additionally, as part of the agreement, Russian forces pulled back and consolidated into
base camps which gave Chechen fighters an opportunity to infiltrate back into Chechen
towns and villages.
Budennovsk was followed by a series of more varied terrorist attacks in rapid
succession, from June 1995 through late January 1996. In all, the seven-month Chechen
campaign of terror very effectively swayed public opinion against the war effort, created
widespread fear among the Russian population well beyond the borders of Chechnya, and
capitalized on the vulnerabilities of Russia's fragile political structures.
Russian forces never regained the tactical prominence or momentum they had lost
in June 1995. The Russian war effort was stymied, and the problems that had afflicted
Russian forces all along became magnified. In March 1996 in an effort to secure
reelection, President Boris Yeltsin rushed into a cease fire agreement and a plan for
withdrawing Russian forces. When he reneged on the agreement and gave the order to
resume attacks on Chechen positions, it was too late for Russian forces that in the
previous year had lost their willingness and ability to fight. Chechens retook Grozny in
August 1996 with little effort.
Budennovsk was the turning point of the Chechen War, the first in a series of
terrorist attacks by Chechen combatants that disabled Russia politically and militarily.
Chechnya would assuredly have lost the war in the summer or fall of 1995. Terrorism
determined Chechnya's success and Russia's loss.
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Figure 3 : Shamil Basayev at a press conference in the
Budennovsk hospital during the June 1 995 hostage raid
Figure 4: Jokhar Dudayev (Chechen President until
his death in April 1996)
Figure 5: Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev
Figure 6: Salman Raduyev, leader of the Kizlyar raid in
January 1996
Figure 7: Asian Maskhadov, President of
Chechnya
Figure 8: Russian President Boris Yeltsin, right,




Figure 9: Chechen captor with hostages inside the
Budennovsk hospital
Figure 10: The first dead from the hospital are turned
over to Russian authorities
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Figure 12: Remaining hostages emerge from the hospital











Figure 15: Pervomayskoye is left in ruins after a
prolonged battle between Russian authorities and
Chechen rebels following the Kizlyar hostage
raid, led by Salman Raduyev, in January 1 996
Figure 16: Russian soldiers in the vicinity of Vedeno,
Chechnya
Figure 17: Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya, in ruins five
months into the war (May 1995) Figure 18: Chechen woman looks
for a relative among the dead
outside of Grozny
Figure 19: Chechen corpses outside Samashki
following a Russian assault in April 1 995
Figure 20: Chechen fighter tosses a grenade into a




\Figure 21 : Chechen fighters praying in a
mountain camp in southern Chechnya
Figure 23: Chechen men in a victorious pose among the rubble (Chechen flag in upper left)
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APPENDIX. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN CHECHNYA
1991-1996
This chronology has been compiled to serve as a quick reference for key historical events
surrounding the Chechen War. It has been designed specifically to compliment the
thesis, Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.
Summer 1988 - Anti-communist political parties begin to emerge in Chechnya.
January 1989 - The first Chechen, Doku Zavgaev, is elected as Communist Party
Secretary in Chechnya.
23 November 1990 - The Chechen National Congress (CNC) is convened; Jokhar
Dudayev is elected as the Executive Committee Chairman.
17-19 August 1991 - Failed coup attempt occurs in Moscow; Shamil Basayev, in
Moscow at the time, takes part in support of Yeltsin.
6 September 1991 - Dudayev gains control of the Chechen government by forcing
Zavgaev to sign a statement abdicating his presidential powers to the Executive
Committee.
15 September 1991 - The Ingush assembly passes a resolution to separate from
Chechnya.
27 October 1991 - Jokhar Dudayev is elected President of Chechnya and declares
Chechen independence from Russia.
7 November 1991 - Yeltsin declares a state of emergency in the Chechen Republic and
dispatches troops to Grozny. Chechen rebels hold the Russian troops at the Grozny
airport until the state of emergency fails to gain confirmation three days later. (During
this time, Shamil Basayev hijacks a Turkish passenger plane.)
January 1992 - Chechnya gets involved in the Abkhazian struggle for independence from
Georgia by providing political asylum to deposed Georgian President Zvaid
Gumsakhurdia and by sending Chechen troops, led by Basayev, into Abkhazia.
4 January 1992 - The Supreme Soviet adopts into law the creation of the Inguish
Republic in the Russian Federation.
1992-1994 - Chechnya erodes into a civil war and Russia suspected of providing support
to Dudayev's opposition.
26 November 1994 - Russian troops are captured aiding in an attack against Dudayev.
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1 1 December 1994 - Russia launches a full-scale military attack into Chechnya only two
days after Yeltsin signs the war decree.
19 January 1995 - Russian troops occupy the Presidential Palace in the Chechen capital
of Grozny.
March 1995 - The OSCE begins a monitoring mission inside Chechnya.
Late-April 1 995 - Chechen fighters have been forced deep into the southern mountains
and Russian forces are beginning to attack the last remaining Chechen strongholds.
14 June 1995 - Basayev and approximately 150 Chechen troops conduct a terrorist attack
on the Russian town of Budennovsk. They take more than 1,500 civilians hostage and
hold them in the town hospital.
18-19 June 1995 - Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomydrin negotiates with Basayev
over live television. Russia halts military operations in Chechnya, and Basayev and his
men are guaranteed safe return back to Chechnya.
30 July 1995 - Russia and Chechnya sign a cease-fire agreement. Russian forces pull
back into base camps throughout Chechnya. Chechen forces begin to infiltrate back into
Chechen towns and villages.
August 1995 - Dudayev disavows the post-Budennovsk agreements.
November 1995 - Basayev plants a package of radioactive material inside a Moscow
park and leads a reporter to the site.
9-19 January 1996 - Chechen field commander Salman Raduyev leads a terrorist attack
on town of Kizlyar. The following day Raduyev is halted trying to return to Chechnya
with hostages and a stand off with federal troops takes place in Pervomayskoye.
16 January 1996 - 'Friends of Basayev' hijack a Turkish ferry taking 151 hostages.
6 March 1996 - Chechen forces retake parts of Grozny.
31 March 1996 - Russia begins a partial withdrawal of troops from Chechnya.
21 April 1996 - Dudayev is killed by Russian rocket fire; Chechen Vice-President
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev assumes the Presidency.
27 May 1996 - Yeltsin and Yandarbiyev meet in Moscow and agree to the terms of
cease-fire.
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18 June 1996 - Alexander Lebed is appointed as Security Council Secretary for the
Russian Federation. He vows to bring an end to the war in Chechnya.
July 1996 - Yeltsin wins reelection. Moscow quickly reneges on the cease-fire
agreement and resumes attacks on Chechen positions.
6 August 1996 - Heavy fighting resumes in Grozny; Basayev leads Chechen fighters and
reclaims the city.
10-12 August 1996 - Alexander Lebed takes over negotiations with Chechen officials; a
cease-fire promptly begins.
22 August 1996 - An agreement over the conditions of a truce is reached between Lebed
and Maskhadov, the Chechen Chief of Staff. The agreement delays the decision of
Chechnya's independence for five-years.
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